Pluralistic Virtue Ethics

Abstract This chapter advocates a pluralistic form of virtue ethics according to which there are several ultimate grounds of virtue, features which make traits of character excellences as opposed to deplorable or bad. These are fundamental evaluatively significant features in objects to which virtue is characteristically responsive (such as the value of those items). We call these fundamental features bases of ethical response. We could say then that virtues have but one ultimate general ground if there is but one basis of ethical response and a plurality of ultimate grounds if there are several (such as value, status, and the good for an individual). Thus, according to a monistic form of virtue ethics, for all traits, what makes that trait a virtue is that it is a disposition of (basically) correct responsiveness to the fundamental basis of ethical response (such as value, or the good for an agent), whereas for a pluralistic virtue ethics for any virtue what makes that trait a virtue is that it is a disposition of characteristically good or correct responsiveness to any or all of a number of fundamental bases of ethical response (such as value, considerations of status, and the good for).