Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 7

Abstract Oxford Studies in Epistemology is a biennial journal offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board composed of leading epistemologists in North America, Europe, and Australasia, the journal publishes exemplary papers in epistemology, broadly construed. Topics within its purview include: (a) traditional epistemological questions concerning the nature of belief, justification, and knowledge, the status of skepticism, the nature of the a priori etc.; (b) new developments in epistemology, including movements (such as naturalized epistemology, feminist epistemology, social epistemology, virtue epistemology, and comparative epistemology) and approaches (such as contextualism); (c) foundational questions in decision-theory; (d) confirmation theory and other branches of philosophy of science that bear on traditional issues in epistemology; (e) topics in the philosophy of perception relevant to epistemology; (f) topics in cognitive science, computer science, developmental, cognitive and social psychology that bear directly on traditional epistemological questions; and (g) work that examines connections between epistemology and other branches of philosophy, including work on testimony, the ethics of belief, etc. Topics addressed in volume 7 include attention, epistemic virtue, Nyāya epistemology, knowledge-action principles, epistemic justice, trust, knowledge-first epistemology, transparency, self-knowledge, and moral epistemology. Papers make use of a variety of different tools and insights, including those of formal epistemology and decision theory, as well as traditional philosophical analysis and argumentation.