Social Hinge Epistemology

Abstract Hinge epistemology builds on Wittgenstein’s insight in On Certainty that justification and knowledge always depend on a system of assumptions, or “hinges” (OC 341–343). It has been subjected to various developments over the years. The focus has been primarily on the distinctive bearing of hinge epistemology on the issue of perceptual justification (and knowledge), on its anti-skeptical import, and on its implications for relativism. More recently, however, its applications to social epistemology have started being investigated. The present chapter focuses on the distinctive contributions hinge epistemology can make with respect to several prominent issues in social epistemology. In section 1 the topic of deep disagreement between parties to a dispute who hold different hinges is taken up. Section 2 deals with the structure of testimonial justification, where hinge epistemology provides a middle ground between reductionists and anti-reductionists. In section 3 the notion of hinge trust is introduced, and its implications for extant theories of trust and its bearing on testimony are considered. Section 4 deals with the issue of epistemic injustice, where hinge epistemology can help explain the epistemic role prejudices and implicit bias play in the transmission of knowledge as well as the mechanism by means of which they can be overcome. Finally, section 5 deals with the relationship between hinge epistemology and Wittgenstein-inspired feminist epistemology.