Evidentialism and Social Epistemology

Abstract Traditionally, epistemology has been individualistic. Evidentialism fits squarely in this individualistic tradition. According to evidentialism, it is the mental states of the subject alone that fully determine what she is justified in believing. More recently, epistemology has become more and more social, moving away from this individualistic paradigm. Social epistemology examines the social nature of knowledge and rationality and thus engages in projects that are a departure from more traditional epistemology. It might be thought that social epistemology has no room for the evidentialist. This chapter argues that one can be an evidentialist as well as a thoroughgoing social epistemologist. Section 1 explains individualistic epistemology and evidentialism. Section 2 highlights some of the central projects of social epistemology. Section 3 argues that none of the projects in section 2 are in conflict with evidentialism and that many can be fruitfully pursued from within an evidentialist framework. Sections 4–7 examine and respond to two challenges to a successful evidentialist social epistemology. The first, inspired by Goldberg (2010), claims that evidentialism is ill-equipped to handle the insights regarding the epistemic importance of what is happening in the minds of others. The second, inspired by Lackey (2018), claims that evidentialism is unable to address a form of epistemic injustice. The chapter shows that both challenges can be met by the evidentialist.