Revisiting Presidential Reorganization

<p>For much of the twentieth century, Congress repeatedly delegated to presidents the authority to “reorganize” the executive branch. Presidents from both parties used this authority to create agencies, consolidate functions, shift responsibilities across the bureaucracy, and otherwise reshape the administrative state. Congress kept itself in the loop by reserving the right to “veto” proposals with which a majority of legislators disagreed, but the streamlined process for executive reorganization nevertheless smoothed the way for various forms of bureaucratic change. All of this came to an end in 1984 when Congress allowed the last of the Reorganization Acts to expire. Although presidents and legislators from both parties have at times floated the idea of restoring the authority anew, these proposals have never really managed to get off the ground.&nbsp;</p> <p>This Article examines the 50-year history of executive reorganization—including why it lasted as long as it did, why it came to an end, and why now might be the time to consider restoring the authority anew. It begins by drawing on a review of the 115 reorganization plans proposed between 1939 and 1984 to highlight the role that executive reorganization played in the broader history of bureaucratic change. It demonstrates that although executive reorganization was never the primary mechanism for restructuring the federal bureaucracy, it served as an important residual tool for accomplishing the sorts of structural reforms that were especially likely to stall in the ordinary legislative process—even when they enjoyed majoritarian support.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p> <p>This Article then revisits the conventional account for why executive reorganization died when it did. Most have assumed that reorganization was yet another casualty of the Supreme Court’s decision in I.N.S. v. Chadha, which invalidated the legislative veto on separation of powers grounds. Yet as Part II makes clear, executive reorganization could very well have survived the legislative veto’s demise. Indeed, shortly after Chadha was decided, Congress and the Reagan administration had identified a plausible post-Chadha substitute in the form of a legislative fast-track process, which would have preserved many of the practical advantages of the earlier regime. What ultimately killed executive reorganization was a broader political an intellectual shift away from formal bureaucratic restructuring, in favor of various “flexible” forms of interagency coordination that promised to accomplish the same objectives at a much lower cost.&nbsp;</p> <p>This Article concludes by arguing that now may be the time to consider restoring executive reorganization authority anew. It highlights the limits of informal coordination as a substitute for bureaucratic restructuring. And it argues that that executive reorganization has the potential to address, at least to some extent, a growing asymmetry in public law—namely, the degree to which the status quo makes it easier to destroy existing administrative capacity than to build it anew. Finally, it considers the obvious objections to delegating still more power to the executive at a time when presidents already enjoy unmatched authority—but argues that if anything, executive reorganization via a legislative “fast-track” process may offer a promising alternative to the current pattern of governance-by-Executive-Order by making it easier for majorities to effectuate their policy preferences into law.&nbsp;<i></i></p>