The Discourse of Dignity in the Charlie Gard, Alfie Evans and Isaiah Haastrup Cases

Abstract There are competing accounts of dignity and no agreement about how to adjudicate between them, but this does not prevent dignity from playing an important role in the law. In fact, this very multiplicity enables dignity to perform a range of functions, both explicit and implicit, intended and unintended. Its ‘open character’ allows dignity to serve as a locus of agreement, but it can also silence debate and limit speaker control of how their statements are received and interpreted. This paper considers dignity’s roles in recent English court judgments relating to withdrawal of ventilation and associated care from three unresponsive, paralysed infants: Charlie Gard, Alfie Evans, and Isaiah Haastrup. It presents a critical discourse analysis focusing on the judgments of first instance in relation to these infants. It argues that a range of conceptions of dignity are operationalised, serving four functions: to express esteem; to establish a hierarchy of credibility; to justify a best interests judgment, and to socialise that judgment. The overall effect is that dignity serves to compel acceptance of, rather than providing reasons to support, a best interests judgment. While recognising the value of unspecified invocations of dignity, we voice a warning about its potential to stifle debate and legitimise and enforce existing power relations.