Dissent and Unity in Metaphilosophy

Statements about philosophy in the history of philosophy and in recent metaphilosophical debates depend on first-order philosophical commitments and backgrounds, which poses both a threat and a chance for metaphilosophy as a discipline. The article aims to provide a current picture of metaphilosophy and its possible future design. It explores the problem of first-order philosophical preconceptions in metaphilosophy and suggests a strategy for the further disciplinary development of metaphilosophy. At first, it points at the problem via analysis of Camus’, Husserl’s, and Carnap’s implicit and Rescher’s, Williamson’s, and Fraisopi’s explicit metaphilosophical views. Neither a universal account of philosophy nor a neutral metaphilosophy are in sight. Nevertheless, as the article shows next, a descriptive perspective on existing contributions reveals certain continuity and disciplinary structure in metaphilosophy regarding its subject matter, placement, and existing topics. A complementary normative perspective that demands philosophy-oriented metaphilosophy focusing on inclusivity and universality can lead to more effective discourse formations, problem-solving, and knowledge maximization in this discipline.