Berkeley on Qualities

Abstract The first section of this chapter deals with the so-called primary/secondary quality distinction in Berkeley’s seventeenth-century context, focusing on Locke. The next section discusses Berkeley’s interpretation of the “materialists’ ” conception of secondary qualities. Following that is an examination of the aspects common to Berkeleyan sensible qualities and to Cartesian and Lockean ideas of sense. The fourth section details the aspects that Berkeleyan sensible ideas share with Cartesian and Lockean primary qualities. The next section studies the heterogeneity thesis concerning visible and tangible ideas (qualities) and its role in supporting Berkeley’s metaphysics of immaterialism and idealism. The final two sections discuss Berkeley’s objections to the primary/secondary quality distinction and the complex relation between (a) perceptual relativity and (b) the epistemic and metaphysical status of primary qualities and proper sensibles. Although the primary/secondary quality distinction cannot survive in Berkeley’s philosophy, it is argued that some of its functions are preserved in his distinction between tangible qualities and those of the other senses. Finally, the chapter addresses the question of whether there are other vestiges of the primary/secondary quality distinction in Berkeley’s philosophy.