Linguistic Luck

Abstract §I concerns two questions: To what extent are linguistic tokens in utterances accidental relative to linguistic rules, and hence “r-lucky”? To what extent are linguistic rules, hence expressions governed by them, accidental relative to human nature and, thus “i-lucky”? Linguistic pragmatists (contextualists) have argued, in effect, that there is a lot more r-luck around than has customarily been thought. This chapter presents a case, drawing on more detailed presentations elsewhere, that the pragmatists are wrong about this. Devitt agrees with Chomsky that there is a lot less i-luck than used to be thought. §II, considers Rey and Collins’ (RC’s) critique (Chapter 5, this volume) of Devitt’s views of language and linguistics, views that underlie its theses about linguistic luck. They are particularly concerned to rebut Devitt’s alternative view to the Chomskians’ of “the explanatory scope of linguistics.” That alternative is the “linguistic conception” of grammars according to which a grammar is about a non-psychological realm of linguistic expressions, physical entities forming a representational system. This contrasts with the received Chomskian psychological conception according to which a grammar is about a speaker’s linguistic competence and hence about mental states. RC’s critique revolves around a mantra charging Devitt with “common-sense conventionalism.” With one half of the mantra, RC conflate the linguistic conception with Devitt’s alleged “conventionalism.” The other half of RC’s mantra charges Devitt with an awful methodology and uses this to discredit his position. Both charges are baseless.