The Problem of Evil as a Problem of Axiological Expectation Mismatch

Abstract This chapter argues that the problem of evil is much deeper than it is normally conceived to be because the core is relevant not only to traditional theists but also to proponents of many alternative views. To defend this view, the chapter purports to show that the problem of evil is a specific version of a broader conundrum, the ‘problem of axiological expectation mismatch’. First, the chapter presents a relatively facile way of showing that being a traditional theist is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for being a target of the problem of evil. It then presents a more substantial way of showing how the problem of evil poses a challenge for atheists/non-theists as well as traditional theists. Finally, the chapter explains that existing theistic responses to the problem of evil can be understood as attempts to resolve an ‘axiological expectation mismatch’ which the problem of evil raises.