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Misfiring Textual Canons
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The textual canons rank among the most important tools of modern statutory interpretation. Though some already boasted centuries of use, their authority has reached new heights in the Textualist era. Today, that authority rests primarily on the claim that they reliably predict how an ordinary person would understand statutory text, and thus promote “fair notice.” Indeed, Justice Scalia praised the textual canons as “so commonsensical that, were they not couched in Latin, you would find it hard to believe that anyone could criticize them.”<br><br>Recently, however, the widespread and often mechanical application of the canons has exposed cracks in that rationale. And spurred by a nascent movement seeking to ground statutory interpretation in real-world empirics, commentators have begun to question Justice Scalia’s position—asserting there is a need to test, rather than merely assume, whether the conventions embodied by the canons in fact reflect common sense. <br><br>This Article does just that. We develop and execute a holistic fair-notice evaluation of four foundational textual canons: 1) noscitur a sociis, 2) ejusdem generis, 3) inclusio unius, and 4) the last-antecedent rule. Drawing on a nationally representative sample of more than one thousand U.S. English-speakers, we present survey participants with statutory provisions for which the canons ostensibly offer “commonsensical” constructions. Then, we ask them whether they think the statutes apply to particular fact patterns—testing, in effect, how often the canons align with the intuitions of ordinary people across a variety of contexts, including flagship Supreme Court cases.<br><br>Then, we dig deeper. The canons do not exist in a vacuum; the text they interpret inevitably interacts with external sources of meaning. To measure how robustly the canons explain ordinary meaning, we embed additional experiments in our survey design. These experiments test whether ordinary intuitions track with the canons when policy context, legislative intent, or personal preferences favor other interpretations. <br><br>Two key patterns emerge. First, the textual canons frequently misfire. To have maintained their dominance under a fair-notice rationale, one would expect the textual canons to predict a near-consensus of ordinary people’s interpretations. In reality, not only do all four canons categorically fail to achieve that predictive power, but some canons also affirmatively contradicted the interpretations of most ordinary people. Second, purpose permeates the canons’ application. We find that ordinary intuitions about the law’s meaning are driven not only by the law’s text, but by its perceived intent. Interestingly, we find no consistent effects of political ideology on interpretation, though we do observe correlation between approval of the law and interpreting it expansively.<br><br>Taken together, our findings challenge the modern consensus supporting the textual canons. We offer three conclusions. First, it may be time to de-canonize noscitur a sociis, ejusdem generis, inclusio unius, and the last-antecedent rule. While they are not without grammatical basis, our results suggest that they misfire too frequently to deserve their canonical status under a fair-notice rationale. Alternatively, the textual canons can find a different normative basis: that they reflect ordinary usage among lawyers. Finally, a future for the canons could involve a return to the more holistic approaches of generations past. If statutory interpreters truly wish to reach the legal constructions that ordinary people do, they must read the law—and apply the textual canons—purposively.
Title: Misfiring Textual Canons
Description:
The textual canons rank among the most important tools of modern statutory interpretation.
Though some already boasted centuries of use, their authority has reached new heights in the Textualist era.
Today, that authority rests primarily on the claim that they reliably predict how an ordinary person would understand statutory text, and thus promote “fair notice.
” Indeed, Justice Scalia praised the textual canons as “so commonsensical that, were they not couched in Latin, you would find it hard to believe that anyone could criticize them.
”<br><br>Recently, however, the widespread and often mechanical application of the canons has exposed cracks in that rationale.
And spurred by a nascent movement seeking to ground statutory interpretation in real-world empirics, commentators have begun to question Justice Scalia’s position—asserting there is a need to test, rather than merely assume, whether the conventions embodied by the canons in fact reflect common sense.
<br><br>This Article does just that.
We develop and execute a holistic fair-notice evaluation of four foundational textual canons: 1) noscitur a sociis, 2) ejusdem generis, 3) inclusio unius, and 4) the last-antecedent rule.
Drawing on a nationally representative sample of more than one thousand U.
S.
English-speakers, we present survey participants with statutory provisions for which the canons ostensibly offer “commonsensical” constructions.
Then, we ask them whether they think the statutes apply to particular fact patterns—testing, in effect, how often the canons align with the intuitions of ordinary people across a variety of contexts, including flagship Supreme Court cases.
<br><br>Then, we dig deeper.
The canons do not exist in a vacuum; the text they interpret inevitably interacts with external sources of meaning.
To measure how robustly the canons explain ordinary meaning, we embed additional experiments in our survey design.
These experiments test whether ordinary intuitions track with the canons when policy context, legislative intent, or personal preferences favor other interpretations.
<br><br>Two key patterns emerge.
First, the textual canons frequently misfire.
To have maintained their dominance under a fair-notice rationale, one would expect the textual canons to predict a near-consensus of ordinary people’s interpretations.
In reality, not only do all four canons categorically fail to achieve that predictive power, but some canons also affirmatively contradicted the interpretations of most ordinary people.
Second, purpose permeates the canons’ application.
We find that ordinary intuitions about the law’s meaning are driven not only by the law’s text, but by its perceived intent.
Interestingly, we find no consistent effects of political ideology on interpretation, though we do observe correlation between approval of the law and interpreting it expansively.
<br><br>Taken together, our findings challenge the modern consensus supporting the textual canons.
We offer three conclusions.
First, it may be time to de-canonize noscitur a sociis, ejusdem generis, inclusio unius, and the last-antecedent rule.
While they are not without grammatical basis, our results suggest that they misfire too frequently to deserve their canonical status under a fair-notice rationale.
Alternatively, the textual canons can find a different normative basis: that they reflect ordinary usage among lawyers.
Finally, a future for the canons could involve a return to the more holistic approaches of generations past.
If statutory interpreters truly wish to reach the legal constructions that ordinary people do, they must read the law—and apply the textual canons—purposively.
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