Javascript must be enabled to continue!
Introspection, epistemology of
View through CrossRef
If we wish to know what is going on in someone else’s mind, we must observe their behaviour; on the basis of what we observe, we may sometimes reasonably draw a conclusion about the person’s mental state. Thus, for example, on seeing someone smile, we infer that they are happy; on seeing someone scowl, we infer that they are upset. But this is not, at least typically, the way in which we come to know our own mental states. We do not need to examine our own behaviour in order to know how we feel, what we believe, what we want and so on. Our understanding of these things is more direct than our understanding of the mental states of others, it seems. The term used to describe this special mode of access which we seem to have to our own mental states is ‘introspection’.
A view which takes its inspiration from Descartes holds that introspection provides us with infallible and complete access to our states of mind. On this view, introspection provides us with a foundation for our knowledge of the physical world. On this view we come to know the physical world by first coming to recognize certain features of our mind, namely, the sensations which physical objects excite in us, and then drawing conclusions about the likely source of these mental states. Our knowledge of the physical world is thus indirect; it is grounded in the direct knowledge we have of our own minds. The view that introspection provides an infallible and complete picture of the mind, however, is no longer widely accepted.
Introspection has also been called upon to support various metaphysical conclusions. Descartes argued for dualism on the basis of introspective evidence, and certain contemporary philosophers have argued in much the same spirit. Hume noted that introspection does not reveal the presence of an enduring self, but only a series of fleeting perceptions; some have concluded, therefore, that there is no enduring self.
Philosophers concerned with self-improvement, whether epistemological or moral, have frequently called upon introspection. Introspection has been thought to aid in forming beliefs on the basis of adequate evidence, and it has been used as a tool of self-scrutiny by those concerned to understand and refine their motivations and characters.
Title: Introspection, epistemology of
Description:
If we wish to know what is going on in someone else’s mind, we must observe their behaviour; on the basis of what we observe, we may sometimes reasonably draw a conclusion about the person’s mental state.
Thus, for example, on seeing someone smile, we infer that they are happy; on seeing someone scowl, we infer that they are upset.
But this is not, at least typically, the way in which we come to know our own mental states.
We do not need to examine our own behaviour in order to know how we feel, what we believe, what we want and so on.
Our understanding of these things is more direct than our understanding of the mental states of others, it seems.
The term used to describe this special mode of access which we seem to have to our own mental states is ‘introspection’.
A view which takes its inspiration from Descartes holds that introspection provides us with infallible and complete access to our states of mind.
On this view, introspection provides us with a foundation for our knowledge of the physical world.
On this view we come to know the physical world by first coming to recognize certain features of our mind, namely, the sensations which physical objects excite in us, and then drawing conclusions about the likely source of these mental states.
Our knowledge of the physical world is thus indirect; it is grounded in the direct knowledge we have of our own minds.
The view that introspection provides an infallible and complete picture of the mind, however, is no longer widely accepted.
Introspection has also been called upon to support various metaphysical conclusions.
Descartes argued for dualism on the basis of introspective evidence, and certain contemporary philosophers have argued in much the same spirit.
Hume noted that introspection does not reveal the presence of an enduring self, but only a series of fleeting perceptions; some have concluded, therefore, that there is no enduring self.
Philosophers concerned with self-improvement, whether epistemological or moral, have frequently called upon introspection.
Introspection has been thought to aid in forming beliefs on the basis of adequate evidence, and it has been used as a tool of self-scrutiny by those concerned to understand and refine their motivations and characters.
Related Results
Introspection
Introspection
Abstract
This book is about introspection and its use in scientific theorising about the mind. It deals with two connected questions: What is introspection? Does int...
Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 7
Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 7
Abstract
Oxford Studies in Epistemology is a biennial journal offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field. Under the guidance of a d...
Naturalized epistemology
Naturalized epistemology
The term ‘naturalized epistemology’ was coined by W.V. Quine to refer to an approach to epistemology which he introduced in his 1969 essay ‘Epistemology Naturalized’. Many of the m...
Applied Epistemology
Applied Epistemology
Abstract
Applied epistemology brings the tools of contemporary epistemology to bear on particular issues of social concern. While the field of social epistemology ha...
Virtue Epistemology: on the 40th Anniversary of the Turn in Analytical Philosophy
Virtue Epistemology: on the 40th Anniversary of the Turn in Analytical Philosophy
The article summarizes the main developments in virtue epistemology and reacts to the challenges faced by the discipline. This new trend in analytic epistemology emerges as a synth...
Oxford Studies In Epistemology
Oxford Studies In Epistemology
Abstract
Oxford Studies in Epistemology is a biennial publicaton which offers a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field. Under the guidance...
Social epistemology
Social epistemology
Social epistemology encompasses the study of the social dimensions of knowledge acquisition and transmission (Palermos and Pritchard 2013), the evaluation of beliefs and belief-for...
Social Hinge Epistemology
Social Hinge Epistemology
Abstract
Hinge epistemology builds on Wittgenstein’s insight in On Certainty that justification and knowledge always depend on a system of assumptions, or “hinges” (...

