The Conflict Between Reason and Revelation in al-Ghazali’s Tahāfut al-Falāsifah: A Critical Study of Intellectual Sources

Abstract This study offers a critical reappraisal of Abu Hamid al-Ghazali’s Tahāfut al-Falāsifah, challenging the common view that he rejected philosophy entirely. By closely reading the text using both the approved English translation and the original Arabic and situating it within Ash‘arite theology and Avicennan metaphysics, the study highlights al-Ghazali’s nuanced and strategic engagement with philosophy. Rather than a blanket rejection of reason, Tahāfut al-Falāsifah presents a selective critique of metaphysical claims that, in al-Ghazali’s view, exceed the limits of reason and conflict with revelation. The analysis explores key themes such as al-Ghazali’s affirmation of divine will over necessity, his use of logic in defending theology, and his integration of Sufi concepts such as kashf and dhawq to expose the limits of discursive reasoning. It shows how he classifies philosophical doctrines as acceptable, irrelevant, or heretical, positioning revelation as the ultimate guide to truth. The study also reflects on the contemporary relevance of al-Ghazali’s thought for debates on metaphysics and the harmony of intellectual and spiritual knowledge. Moreover, this work reframes Tahāfut al-Falāsifah as a constructive synthesis of philosophy and theology, affirming its place as a landmark in Islamic intellectual history and as a model of bounded rationality that continues to resonate today.