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Quasi-Realist Expressivism
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This chapter explains how, for quasi-realism to be a distinctive meta-ethical view, quasi-realists must use the word ‘true’ in some stronger, more-than-minimal sense. It demonstrates this sense through an assumption that, when we make some claims which seem to be meta-ethical, we are really making first-order, normative claims. In addition, the chapter argues that, when we believe that some act is wrong, most of us assume that our belief is, or at least might be, true. If expressivists deny that such beliefs might be true, they should become error theorists. Quasi-realist expressivists could instead claim that, when we say that some act is wrong, we both express an attitude of being against such acts, and claim that, in having this attitude, we are getting things right. If we are getting things right, such claims would be true. This wider version of quasi-realism would be one form of cognitivism.
Title: Quasi-Realist Expressivism
Description:
This chapter explains how, for quasi-realism to be a distinctive meta-ethical view, quasi-realists must use the word ‘true’ in some stronger, more-than-minimal sense.
It demonstrates this sense through an assumption that, when we make some claims which seem to be meta-ethical, we are really making first-order, normative claims.
In addition, the chapter argues that, when we believe that some act is wrong, most of us assume that our belief is, or at least might be, true.
If expressivists deny that such beliefs might be true, they should become error theorists.
Quasi-realist expressivists could instead claim that, when we say that some act is wrong, we both express an attitude of being against such acts, and claim that, in having this attitude, we are getting things right.
If we are getting things right, such claims would be true.
This wider version of quasi-realism would be one form of cognitivism.
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