Javascript must be enabled to continue!
The New Hume
View through CrossRef
The “New Humeans” attribute to Hume what they call a “skeptical realist” view. A skeptical realist about some entity is realist about the entity’s existence, but agnostic about the nature or character of that thing because it is epistemically inaccessible. Hume, in the Treatise and throughout his philosophical writings, shows how the illusion that one is referring to something can naturally arise even when there is no such thing to refer to. When Cleanthes asks Demea if “the name (‘God’), without any meaning, is of such mighty importance,” the new skeptical realist can only reply, “Maybe yes, maybe no, but we will never be in a position to decide which.” Such conceptual agnosticism, something a fideist might welcome, would be dismissed by Hume.
Title: The New Hume
Description:
The “New Humeans” attribute to Hume what they call a “skeptical realist” view.
A skeptical realist about some entity is realist about the entity’s existence, but agnostic about the nature or character of that thing because it is epistemically inaccessible.
Hume, in the Treatise and throughout his philosophical writings, shows how the illusion that one is referring to something can naturally arise even when there is no such thing to refer to.
When Cleanthes asks Demea if “the name (‘God’), without any meaning, is of such mighty importance,” the new skeptical realist can only reply, “Maybe yes, maybe no, but we will never be in a position to decide which.
” Such conceptual agnosticism, something a fideist might welcome, would be dismissed by Hume.
Related Results
Hume's Radical Scepticism
Hume's Radical Scepticism
Abstract
The book argues that Hume was a radical sceptic—that he concluded we have no good reason to believe one thing rather than another about the world around ...
Hume and the Molyneux Problem
Hume and the Molyneux Problem
How would Hume have addressed William Molyneux’s question to Locke: would a man born blind but able to distinguish between a sphere and cube by touch, immediately on acquiring sigh...
Hume’s Life and Works
Hume’s Life and Works
This summary account of Hume’s life and works challenges the usual way of telling the story of Hume’s career. It is generally believed that what Hume most wanted to be was a philos...
Hume and the Contemporary “Common Sense” Critique of Hume
Hume and the Contemporary “Common Sense” Critique of Hume
This paper examines the principal objections that Hume’s Scots contemporaries, George Campbell, James Beattie, and Thomas Reid raised against his views of testimony, belief, and th...
Playing with Fire
Playing with Fire
Hume is not a rationalist. This paper attempts to explain why by examining Hume’s argument in Treatise 1.3.3 from his separability principle to the denial of that hallmark of ratio...
The Passions as Original Existences
The Passions as Original Existences
Hume’s thesis that reason and passion cannot be opposed depends in part on his defense of the claim that because passions do not represent, they cannot oppose the representations, ...
Hume’s Philosophical Economics
Hume’s Philosophical Economics
Hume’s economic essays were part of his early project of politics as one of the principal departments of the Science of Man, a project realized, first, by the morals expounded in B...

