Ontology

What is there? Brentano’s formal answer is simply: that in which it is fitting to believe. But in what is it fitting to believe? Brentano’s considered answer to that question is decidedly nominalist, accepting only concrete particulars, such as Socrates, Beyoncé, and the Eiffel Tower in his ontology. However, Brentano’s specific version of nominalism is very different from versions familiar from current-day debates, and involves also very unusual concrete particulars, such as wise-Socrates, famous-Beyoncé, and tall-Eiffel-Tower. The purpose of this chapter is to try to make the contemporary reader see what kind of ontology Brentano had in mind and what drew him to it. It will not quite defend Brentano’s ontology, but it will argue that it is considerably more attractive than may initially appear.