Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy

One would think that scholarship on Merleau-Ponty nearly a half-century after his death would consist largely of mopping up disputed details. But longtime Merleau-Ponty scholar Hass (Muhlenberg College) contends that central points of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, particularly his understanding of cognition, remain largely misunderstood. Hass's aim is twofold: (1) to interpret and defend major strands in Merleau-Ponty's overall thought, including his phenomenological method, work on perception, embodiment, intersubjectivity, and ontology in a way accessible to relative beginners; and (2) to excavate his theory of expression. For Merleau-Ponty, conceptualization and language are not representational products of the mind's access to an ideal or transcendental realm, but rather evidences of the multifaceted expressive possibilities of bodily life. After extensive stage-setting, Hass delves into philosophy of mathematics to make t! he case that Merleau-Ponty's model of cognition is a compelling alternative to current theories. Along the way, he considers many of Merleau-Ponty's most influential critics, including Foucault and Derrida, to arrive at a nuanced assessment of Merleau-Ponty's weaknesses as well as his strengths. The result is a valuable contribution to scholarship bridging analytic and Continental concerns. While clear and largely jargon-free, it remains bracing going. Summing Up: Recommended. Upper-level undergraduates through faculty/researchers. -Choice