Aristotle on Knowledge

This chapter considers Aristotle’s epistemology, focusing on issues explored in Part I. It asks how he conceives of epistêmê in the Posterior Analytics. In particular, is it knowledge and, if so, is it knowledge as such or just a kind of knowledge? In considering this question, the chapter compares Aristotle’s account of epistêmê in the Posterior Analytics with Plato’s account of it in the Meno. It argues that, in defining epistêmê, Aristotle is defining knowledge—but just one kind of knowledge, not knowledge as such. Epistêmê counts as knowledge because it is a truth-entailing cognitive condition that is appropriately cognitively superior to mere true belief. But it isn’t knowledge as such, because Aristotle recognizes other cognitive conditions that also fall under the concept of knowledge but that do not count as epistêmê as it is defined in 1.2