Moral Theory, Moral Dilemmas, and Moral Responsibilities

Abstract Discussion of the possibility of moral dilemmas has coincided to some extent with debate about the viability of moral theory. In fact, it is sometimes suggested that the assertion that there are moral dilemmas is a key element in the critique of moral theory, alongside claims concerning the significance of the plurality of moral considerations, the need to focus on particulars, the impossibility of a decision-procedure in moral deliberation, and the like. As a means of exploring connections between these two issues, I will begin by distinguishing two styles of moral reflection I call rationalism and experientialism. These correspond at least approximately with the respective contentions of proponents and opponents of moral theory. I will then consider the supposition that many of the arguments for and against moral dilemmas can be seen as a dialectic between experientialism and rationalism, and more generally that the insistence on the part of some that there surely are dilemmas evidences an experientialist outlook, while the equally strong conviction on the part of others that there cannot possibly be dilemmas reflects a rationalist temperament. My conclusion will be that this interpretation is revealing, although it cannot be considered a fully accurate or complete account of the moral dilemmas debate.