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Brentano’s Thesis Revisited
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In Psychologie, Brentano introduced a new mark of mental phenomena: all and only mental phenomena are intentional. No physical state or property is intentional. Under the label ‘Brentano’s Thesis’ this mark of the mental has guided philosophical research both by phenomenologists and by analytic philosophers of mind. This chapter reconstructs the view of intentionality that underlies Brentano’s Thesis and finds it under-explained. Brentano clearly struggled to convey to his readers what he took to be the common feature of the mental. The chapter goes on to assess attempts to explain intentionality in independently intelligible terms by such philosophers as Chisholm, Crane, and Molnar, and finds them all wanting.
Title: Brentano’s Thesis Revisited
Description:
In Psychologie, Brentano introduced a new mark of mental phenomena: all and only mental phenomena are intentional.
No physical state or property is intentional.
Under the label ‘Brentano’s Thesis’ this mark of the mental has guided philosophical research both by phenomenologists and by analytic philosophers of mind.
This chapter reconstructs the view of intentionality that underlies Brentano’s Thesis and finds it under-explained.
Brentano clearly struggled to convey to his readers what he took to be the common feature of the mental.
The chapter goes on to assess attempts to explain intentionality in independently intelligible terms by such philosophers as Chisholm, Crane, and Molnar, and finds them all wanting.
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