Knowledge and True Belief in the Meno

Plato’s Meno is often thought to say that knowledge (epistêmê) is true belief (doxa) plus something, where the ‘something’ is often thought to be justification. However, it has also been argued that the Meno doesn’t take knowledge to be a species of, or even to imply, true belief. There is also dispute as to whether epistêmê is knowledge; according to one view, it is understanding instead. The chapter argues that, according to the Meno, epistêmê is a species of true belief: one has epistêmê that p when one has the true belief that p and can explain why p is so. The chapter also argues that this is an account of knowledge, one that is not vulnerable to Gettier-style counterexamples. It also asks whether the Meno holds that knowledge must be based on knowledge and, if it does, whether its account of knowledge is circular. It also suggests that the dialogue rejects the so-called Two Worlds Theory, according to which one can’t know and believe the same things.