Ksenija Atanasijević on Aristotle’s Concept of Friendship

In this paper, we examine Ksenija Atanasijević’s interpretation of Aristotle’s views on friendship, presented in her article “Aristotle’s Understanding of Friendship” (Aristotelovo shvatanje prijateljstva). We first outline Aristotle’s tripartite framework of friendship—based on virtue, pleasure, and utility—emphasizing his view that only the friendship of virtue constitutes a complete, reciprocal bond. The analysis then shifts to Atanasijević’s critique, which highlights both the inherent self-interest underpinning most human relationships and the problematic nature of unequal friendships, particularly in gendered contexts. While acknowledging Aristotle’s profound psychological insights, Atanasijević implicitly challenges his endorsement of hierarchical, male-dominated relationships. We interpret her deliberate omission of a direct critique of gender inequality as a strategic choice aimed at foregrounding the universal, transformative power of friendship—a concept she believed had the potential to enhance both individual lives and broader social reality.