The Epistemology of Desire and the Problem of Nihilism

AbstractMost people have wondered whether anything really matters, some have temporarily thought that nothing really matters, and some philosophers have defended the view that nothing really matters. However, if someone thinks that nothing matters—if they are a “nihilist about value”—then it seems that it is irrational for them to care about anything. It seems that nihilism about value mandates total indifference. However, it is not irrational to care about something that you believe does not matter. Defending this conclusion requires an examination of the nature of desire. It is argued that goodness is the accuracy condition for desire, in the same way that truth is the accuracy condition for belief; that desires, like beliefs, can amount to knowledge; and that that desires, like beliefs, can be irrational. Despite these similarities between desire and belief, and even though it is obviously irrational to believe something that you believe is not true, it is not irrational to desire something you believe is not good. This reveals that nihilism about value does not mandate total indifference. It also shows that nihilism about value can coherently be combined with the anti-Humean view that desire is a species of evaluation.