The Nature of Desire

Desire plays a pivotal role in our lives. Yet in recent times, it has not been a central topic in the philosophy of mind. The aim of this book is to redress this imbalance. What are desires? According to a dogma, desire is a motivational state: desiring is being disposed to act. This conception aligns with the functionalist approach to desire and the standard account of desire’s direction of fit and of its role in explaining action. According to a second influential approach, however, desire is first and foremost an evaluation: desiring is representing something as good. This is in line with the thesis that we cannot desire something without “seeing” any good in it (the “guise of the good”). Are desires motivational states? How are we to understand desire’s direction of fit? How do desires explain action? Are desires evaluative states? Is the guise of the good true? Should we adopt an alternative picture that emphasizes desire’s deontic nature? Which view of desire does the neuroscientific evidence favor? The first section of the volume is devoted to the puzzle of desire’s essence and addresses these questions, among others. The second part investigates some implications that the various conceptions of desire have on a number of fundamental issues: Why are inconsistent desires problematic? What is desire’s role in practical deliberation? How do we know what we want? This volume is bound to contribute to the emergence of a fruitful debate on a neglected, albeit crucial, dimension of the mind.