Celowość prawa jako wartość konstytucyjna

The aim of this paper is to answer the question of whether the purposiveness of law is a constitutional value. If we accept that each constitutional principle of the law expresses constitutional value, the author argues that one may distinguish two kinds of reasoning: the first one is to infer the principle of purposiveness of law from the principle of the rule of law. The second one is based on the proposed definition of law. Because of the problems with application of the first kind of reasoning, author concentrates on the last kind of reasoning. On the basis of two definitions of law, formulated by Gustaw Radbruch and Lon Fuller, the author explains why the purposiveness of law is a binding constitutional value. The main argument is that, if we deny that the purposiveness of law is a binding constitutional value, we at the same time deny law itself. On that assumption, the author concludes that the principle of the rule of law includes a particular principle of purposiveness of law and in consequence, expresses a binding constitutional value of the purposiveness of law.