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Extending the Argument
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This chapter asks whether the argument for optimism presented in Chapters 3–4 may be extended from boundary problems to problems of other types, and argues that it can be—to a type of problem the author calls a constitutive problem. Roughly, a constitutive problem is an explanatory problem that presupposes that various items of philosophical interest are located at the apex of what is called a constitutive hierarchy, a vast and complicated explanatory structure among facts (i.e. true propositions). The argument is presented in the context of the theory of causal explanation defended by David Lewis, and explores how this can be extended to constitutive explanation.
Title: Extending the Argument
Description:
This chapter asks whether the argument for optimism presented in Chapters 3–4 may be extended from boundary problems to problems of other types, and argues that it can be—to a type of problem the author calls a constitutive problem.
Roughly, a constitutive problem is an explanatory problem that presupposes that various items of philosophical interest are located at the apex of what is called a constitutive hierarchy, a vast and complicated explanatory structure among facts (i.
e.
true propositions).
The argument is presented in the context of the theory of causal explanation defended by David Lewis, and explores how this can be extended to constitutive explanation.
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