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The Argument Defended
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This chapter defends the argument of Chapter 3, optimistic argument 1 (OA1), by focusing on eight objections: 1) the successor objection: is there not a successor problem to any solved philosophical problem? 2) The impossible denial objection: isn’t it impossible to deny the boundary theses constitutive of boundary problems? (3) the negativity objection: isn’t any progress made of an objectionably negative sort? (4) the wrong problem objection: isn’t any progress made on the wrong sort of problem? (5) the standards objection: isn’t the case for progress based on overly easy standards? (6) the triviality objection: couldn’t any problem be represented as a boundary problem? (7) the wrong people objection: isn’t any progress made due to scientists rather than philosophers? (8) the reasoning objection: doesn’t the reference to ‘reasonably many’ problems mean that the overall reasoning is no good?
Title: The Argument Defended
Description:
This chapter defends the argument of Chapter 3, optimistic argument 1 (OA1), by focusing on eight objections: 1) the successor objection: is there not a successor problem to any solved philosophical problem? 2) The impossible denial objection: isn’t it impossible to deny the boundary theses constitutive of boundary problems? (3) the negativity objection: isn’t any progress made of an objectionably negative sort? (4) the wrong problem objection: isn’t any progress made on the wrong sort of problem? (5) the standards objection: isn’t the case for progress based on overly easy standards? (6) the triviality objection: couldn’t any problem be represented as a boundary problem? (7) the wrong people objection: isn’t any progress made due to scientists rather than philosophers? (8) the reasoning objection: doesn’t the reference to ‘reasonably many’ problems mean that the overall reasoning is no good?.
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