Reductionism in Engram Neuroscience

ABSTRACT Engrams are a hypothetical construct in neuroscience used to explain memory phenomena. The search for engrams has been energised by the advent of certain reductionist methods that intervene at lower levels of organisation. We defend methodological reductionism as an essential research strategy but argue that such methods alone are insufficient for a complete explanation of memory. Relying solely on these methods perpetuates a field that is data‐rich but understanding‐poor. Explanations in memory neuroscience require theorising about engrams and the conditions for their discovery. This can be facilitated by an integrative pluralism, by which multiple competing models of causal processes are integrated within a broader theoretical framework. We propose that conceiving of engrams as multiply‐realisable, causal motifs—not the standard conceit of a stable, physical entity—is essential for a complete explanation of memory phenomena. As such, methodological reductionism and explanatory integrative pluralism are important conceptual tools in the neuroscientist's toolkit.