Feyerabend’s Epistemology of Mystery and Metaphysics

This paper explores Paul Feyerabend’s epistemology of mystery, tracing its evolution from his earlier epistemological anarchism to its culmination in a metaphysics that emphasises the ineffability of ultimate reality. Feyerabend’s critique of scientific materialism, rooted in his rejection of rigid methodological rules, highlights the historical interplay of rational and irrational elements in scientific progress. Drawing on Aristotle’s conception of metaphysics as free and divine, the paper examines the dynamic relationship between Being and knowing in dialogue with Feyerabend’s pluralistic approach. Our analysis shows Feyerabend’s insistence on the contingent and narrative nature of human knowledge aligning with the Greek recognition of ineffability while diverging in its rejection of metaphysical absolutism. Feyerabend’s later metaphysics embraces change, multiplicity, and the interconnectedness of human practices and Being, challenging the reductionism of scientific realism. Feyerabend’s ‘manifest reality’ shaped by cultural and historical conditions likely betrays the influence of Frege’s formal systems on his thought, exemplified in his critique of Parmenides’ monism. The study further discusses Feyerabend’s dynamic metaphysics in light of Pseudo-Dionysius’s influence, emphasising ultimate reality as unknowable yet responsive to human engagement. By juxtaposing these perspectives, a renewed engagement with metaphysics in contemporary philosophy is warranted. Such a renewed focus highlights metaphysics’ role in challenging epistemological constraints, fostering an understanding of reality that integrates ontology and epistemology. Ultimately, the paper positions Feyerabend’s work as a bridge between classical metaphysics and modern philosophical inquiry, challenging the dominance of reductionist frameworks and advocating for a pluralistic, narrative-rich approach to science and epistemology.