Lobbying for Internal Legitimacy: Agricultural Cooperative Strategy Revision in Japan, 1970–1986

Agricultural cooperatives (ACs) are widely recognized as interest groups engaged in lobbying activities, yet the purposes underlying their lobbying strategies remain undertheorized. Drawing on the neopluralist perspective in political science and organizational legitimacy theory, this study examines whether and how concerns about internal legitimacy—legitimacy conferred by organizational members—drive lobbying strategy revision in member-based organizations. We analyze the case of JA Zenchu, the representative body of Japanese agricultural cooperatives, during a period of significant strategic revision from 1970 to 1986. Through qualitative documentary analysis of 40 internal archival documents held at the Zenchu Archive, we demonstrate that government agricultural policy shifts constrained Zenchu's capacity to deliver material benefits to members, thereby threatening internal legitimacy. In response, Zenchu systematically revised its strategy, shifting from direct lobbying toward indirect media campaigns emphasizing agricultural social values. This strategic shift functioned as a legitimacy recovery mechanism by providing non-material incentives—solidary and purposive—to members during a period when material incentive provision was constrained. Our findings suggest that lobbying can serve organizational maintenance functions beyond policy influence, and that cooperative political engagement should be understood as part of internal governance addressing structural challenges inherent in cooperative organization. Practical implications for cooperative management are discussed.