Self-Deception in Mengzi 5A2

Abstract The truth thesis of virtue, widely adopted by Neo-Aristotelians, holds that virtue requires accurate beliefs about what is going on in given circumstances and what actions or values should be pursued, beliefs that constitute or at least inform the right reason that virtuous people follow when choosing to act virtuously. However, is this theoretical commitment indispensable for virtue theory? This essay aims to challenge the attractiveness of that thesis by examining the story of Shun 舜, a moral exemplar, in Mengzi 孟子 5A2. In this passage, Mengzi approvingly recounts how Shun trusted his vicious brother Xiang 象 and showed hospitality to him, despite knowing that Xiang had just tried to murder him. I argue that given its phenomenological and epistemic features, Shun’s psychological state is best understood as involving self-deception, and that given Shun’s status as an exemplar of virtue, Mengzi’s virtue theory supposes there to be a particular sort of epistemic cost for being virtuous, contrary to the truth thesis of virtue. This observation will shed light on how epistemic irrationality could play an important role in one’s moral motivation.