How Alliances Shape Rivalries

Abstract A small body of scholarship has identified asymmetric rivalries as a phenomenon where two unevenly matched states are engaged in drawn-out security competitions or rivalries. Despite pointing out that many rivalries persist between states with significant power disparity, their conflict dynamics remain an understudied topic. Questions such as: why weaker states initiate conflicts against stronger states within a strategic rivalry, and why do some asymmetric rivalries de-escalate while others do not, have not been sufficiently addressed. In this paper, I argue that alliances embolden weaker states to initiate conflicts but also manage to facilitate a greater degree of affinity with their rivals on global and regional issues. Weaker states in a rivalry pursue alliances to equip themselves to fight against stronger rivals. At the same time, allies are also likely to act as a restraint on their partner fearing being dragged into their partner’s conflicts thus contributing to rivalry de-escalation. These two factors lead to two different behaviors: a higher probability of conflict initiation by the weaker state on account of newfound support, and medium to long-term rivalry de-escalation, on account of the weaker state’s ally’s fears of chain-ganging and becoming embroiled in its partner’s conflicts.