Optimization of operation and dispatching of integrated energy system based on Nash bargaining model

  INTRODUCTION: With the growing energy demand, the Integrated Energy System (IES) has attracted wide attention for its high efficiency, economy, and environmental friendliness. Compared with traditional energy systems, IES realizes multi-energy complementarity through the coupling of electricity, heat, gas, and hydrogen. International research focuses on market mechanisms, renewable energy integration, and digital technologies, but issues such as wind-solar output uncertainty and fair benefit distribution in multi-party cooperation remain to be addressed. OBJECTIVES: This paper aims to construct an optimal operation and dispatching model for IES integrating renewable energy, gas-fired thermal power plants, and carbon capture power plants, handle wind-solar output uncertainty, and design a fair benefit distribution mechanism based on Nash bargaining theory to balance economy and environmental protection and maintain cooperation enthusiasm. Compared with traditional methods such as the Shapley value, which allocates benefits based on marginal contributions, the Nash bargaining approach emphasizes fair negotiation outcomes and better accommodates differences in participants' investments, risks, and bargaining power. METHODS: 1. Establish an IES mathematical model covering core equipment such as wind turbines, PV panels, P2G devices, hydrogen storage tanks, and CHP units. 2. Use KDE to fit wind-solar output marginal distribution, construct a joint probability model with Frank Copula function, and generate typical scenarios via K-means clustering. 3. Adopt a two-stage optimization: first, use mixed-integer linear programming to calculate the total alliance revenue; second, apply symmetric/asymmetric Nash bargaining models for benefit distribution. RESULTS: Based on Liaoning regional grid data, the tripartite alliance reduces system operation cost by approximately 22% and increases renewable energy consumption rate by 18% compared with independent operation. P2G and hydrogen storage realize time-shifting energy transfer, and CHP units adjust output to reduce costs. The Nash bargaining-based benefit distribution meets individual and collective rationality, with all parties’ revenues exceeding independent operation. CONCLUSION: The IES model integrating hydrogen storage, P2G, and carbon capture enhances multi-energy complementarity and time-shifting regulation capacity. The Nash bargaining mechanism ensures fair surplus distribution, providing theoretical and methodical references for multi-party IES collaborative operation.