Conclusion

This concluding chapter summarizes the book's major findings from the case studies. As expected, high levels of regime vulnerability increased the domestic costs associated with frenemy coalitions while ideological configurations of ideological betrayal, divided threats, and ideological equidistance reduced the perceived need to commit to these alliances. When these conditions combined, the likelihood of frenemy alliances was low despite strong material incentives pushing for these outcomes. These combined conditions played the key roles in preventing Britain and France from allying with the Soviet Union in the 1930s, in delaying China from allying with the United States from 1972 to 1979, and in ending Turkey's alliance with Israel beginning in 2009. The chapter then discusses the main contributions to the development of international relations theory and policymaking. Prominent in this last analysis is an examination of how the book's argument can help predict the United States' ability to form a broad balancing coalition in Asia to counter the potential hegemonic threat posed by China.