Multi-Entity Collaboration Mechanism of Key Core Technology Innovation Based on Differential Game

Key core technology innovation has become an important strategic path for countries to maintain industrial security amid intensifying global technological competition. As an important innovation paradigm, R&D collaboration is generally regarded as an effective way to achieve such innovation. However, the key issue of which collaborative mechanism is most effective at promoting key core technology innovation remains insufficiently explored. Therefore, systematically comparing the effectiveness of different mechanisms of collaborative innovation is of great strategic significance for achieving key core technology innovation and overcoming Western technological blockades. In this study, the R&D level and market share of key core technology were incorporated into an analytical framework and applied to a differential game focused on the innovation behaviors of leading enterprises, supporting enterprises, and academic research institutions under Nash non-collaborative, cost-sharing, and collaborative mechanisms. A simulation analysis was conducted using the MATLAB 2020a software. The results show that the optimal strategies for the key core technology innovation of innovation entities are negatively correlated with the cost coefficient, discount rate, technology, and market recession coefficient. Meanwhile, they are positively correlated with the sensitivity coefficient of technology R&D and market promotion. Furthermore, the R&D levels and market shares of key core technology are highest under the collaborative mechanism. In this scenario, the revenues of the innovation entity and the overall system reach Pareto optimality. Within a threshold range, the cost-sharing mechanism significantly improves innovative efforts, the R&D level, and the market share of key core technology, leading to a Pareto improvement for both the participants’ and overall system’s revenues compared to the non-collaborative mechanism. This study not only contributes to theoretical results of differential games but also provides valuable suggestions for policymakers and innovation entities to foster key core technology innovation from the perspective of collaboration.