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Who are “we”?: Animalism and conjoined twins
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AbstractVarious cases of conjoined twinning have been presented as problems for the animalist view that we are animals. In some actual and possible cases of human dicephalus that have been discussed in the literature, it is arguable that there are two persons but only one human animal. It is also tempting to believe that there are two persons and one animal in possible instances of craniopagus parasiticus that have been described. Here it is argued that the animalist can admit that these are cases in which human persons are not animals, without forfeiting the title “animalist.” It is also shown that this is not only an option but also a well‐motivated and plausible option for the animalist. Seeing this requires getting clear on what the word “we” should be thought to include in the animalist's claim that we are animals. Here animalism is defended against twinning objections by figuring out how to view the scope of the animalist's identity claim.
Title: Who are “we”?: Animalism and conjoined twins
Description:
AbstractVarious cases of conjoined twinning have been presented as problems for the animalist view that we are animals.
In some actual and possible cases of human dicephalus that have been discussed in the literature, it is arguable that there are two persons but only one human animal.
It is also tempting to believe that there are two persons and one animal in possible instances of craniopagus parasiticus that have been described.
Here it is argued that the animalist can admit that these are cases in which human persons are not animals, without forfeiting the title “animalist.
” It is also shown that this is not only an option but also a well‐motivated and plausible option for the animalist.
Seeing this requires getting clear on what the word “we” should be thought to include in the animalist's claim that we are animals.
Here animalism is defended against twinning objections by figuring out how to view the scope of the animalist's identity claim.
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