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Coalition-Proof Stable Networks

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We propose the notion of coalition-proof stability for predicting the networks that could emerge when group deviations are allowed. A network is coalition-proof stable if there exists no coalition which has a credible group deviation. A coalition is said to have a credible group deviation if there is a profitable group deviation to some network and there is no subcoalition of the deviating players which has a subsequent credible group deviation. Coalition-proof stability is a coarsening of strong stability. There is no relationship between the set of coalition-proof stable networks and the set of networks induced by a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of Myersonís linking game. Contrary to coalition-proof stability, coalition-proof Nash equilibria of Myersonís linking game tend to support unreasonable networks.
Title: Coalition-Proof Stable Networks
Description:
We propose the notion of coalition-proof stability for predicting the networks that could emerge when group deviations are allowed.
A network is coalition-proof stable if there exists no coalition which has a credible group deviation.
A coalition is said to have a credible group deviation if there is a profitable group deviation to some network and there is no subcoalition of the deviating players which has a subsequent credible group deviation.
Coalition-proof stability is a coarsening of strong stability.
There is no relationship between the set of coalition-proof stable networks and the set of networks induced by a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of Myersonís linking game.
Contrary to coalition-proof stability, coalition-proof Nash equilibria of Myersonís linking game tend to support unreasonable networks.

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