Ascending versus Simultaneous Contests

<div> Lobbying was initially and remains a primary motivation for contest theory. &nbsp;<span>Real-world lobbying is often dynamic, but excepting the first contest experiment, the majority of such experiments are simultaneous-decision and almost always feature over-investment relative to theory. &nbsp;</span><span>Spurred by the disconnect between contest motivation and contest experimental design, we introduce a dynamic perturbation of the standard simultaneous contest called the Ascending Contest. &nbsp;</span><span>We compare behavior in this institution to behavior in the canonical experimental contest, to see if over-investment is at least partly an artifact of the latter's simultaneous design. &nbsp;</span><span>Surprisingly, we find no significant difference in aggregate investment across the two institutions. &nbsp;</span><span>Moreover, individual investment is distributed similarly in both settings. &nbsp;</span><span>When we examine individual investment in the Ascending Contest, we find little evidence of best-response behavior. &nbsp;</span><span>This result has implications for mutual best-response as a meaningful benchmark in simultaneous-decision contests.</span> </div>