Germany and «Libyan problem» during 2010-s

Germany has been growing political and military activity in Northern Africa and Sahel region by the mid 2010s. FRG and its EU partners faced the great number of instability risks which are projected from zones of armed conflicts located in northern part of Africa. The key elements of the corridor of instability which has connected the fragile states in Sahel and Northern Africa were the «Libyan door» (the upper part) and «Malian gates» (the lower one). But in the 2010s FRG faced the absence of opportunities for itself to be directly involved in the resolution of «Libyan problem». That is why in 2012-2019 Germany had been trying only to fence «Libyan problem» in. This perimeter has four segments. German contribution to the creation of Western one (the strengthening of Tunisian and Algerian borders with Libya) and especially Eastern segment (the same with Egypt) was rather limited and consisted of arms export to these countries. The article explores the evolution of German participation to the resolution of Mali armed conflict (first of all FRG`s military contribution to EUTM Mali and MINUSMA missions). This one and also German participation in the reform of Niger`s security sector was the creation of Southern segment of the perimeter. By 2020 Germany has deepened cooperation on «Libyan problem» not only with regional players but also world powers. During Merkel`s visit to Moscow (January 11, 2020) the scheme of future Berlin conference on Libya was declared. This format was established on January 19, 2020. Germany became the coordinator of inter-Libyan dialogue (between the Government of national consensus in the West of the country and Libyan national army in the East) and supported it by the launch of the EU mission «IRINI». The article concludes about the perspectives of German policy towards Libya considering COVID-19 pandemics.