Deleuze and the Problem of Affect

Perhaps more than any other philosopher, theorist or critic, Deleuze has been pivotal for the recent ‘affective turn’ in the humanities. Not without reason. He is in large part responsible for popularising the term ‘affect’ by insisting upon the translation of Spinoza’s affectus as ‘affect’ (l’affect), which was long translated as passion or sentiment in French (‘emotion’ in English). And yet, critics and proponents alike have failed to appreciate the extent to which Deleuze himself remains profoundly ambivalent toward affect and embodiment in general. This ambivalence and its longevity have been overlooked, I argue, because it only becomes apparent through a systematic analysis of affect throughout Deleuze’s work. I undertake this analysis in Deleuze and the Problem of Affect. By demonstrating the ways in which, from beginning to end, Deleuze’s system of thought both ruptures and complies with the tradition, most often for one and the same reason, I recalibrate Deleuze’s philosophy and the recent ‘affective turn’ that hinges upon it.