The Testimonial Argumentation

In the encyclical letter Fides et Ratio, Pope John Paul II, summarizes his thinking, his philosophical and theological reflections on the testimonial argumentation: “Human beings are not made to live alone. They are born into a family and in a family they grow, eventually entering society through their activity. From birth, therefore, they are immersed in traditions which give them not only a language and a cultural formation but also a range of truths in which they believe almost instinctively. Yet personal growth and maturity imply that these same truths can be cast into doubt and evaluated through a process of critical enquiry. It may be that, after this time of transition, these truths are “recovered” as a result of the experience of life or by dint of further reasoning. Nonetheless, there are in the life of a human being many more truths which are simply believed than truths which are acquired by way of personal verification. Who, for instance, could assess critically the countless scientific findings upon which modern life is based? Who could personally examine the flow of information which comes day after day from all parts of the world and which is generally accepted as true? Who in the end could forge anew the paths of experience and thought which have yielded the treasures of human wisdom and religion? This means that the human being — the one who seeks the truth — is also the one who lives by belief. In believing, we entrust ourselves to the knowledge acquired by other people. This suggests an important tension. On the one hand, the knowledge acquired through belief can seem an imperfect form of knowledge, to be perfected gradually through personal accumulation of evidence; on the other hand, belief is often humanly richer than mere evidence, because it involves an interpersonal relationship and brings into play not only a person's capacity to know but also the deeper capacity to entrust oneself to others, to enter into a relationship with them which is intimate and enduring.” After reading this Encyclical, we could say that it was written by a reductionist: John Paul II is in fact a suspicious! What does it mean? It simply means that the author considers the testimonial argumentation insufficient, a source (topic), then, which needs - in order to have epistemic value - to use other sources of argument. In itself, it expresses a limited epistemic charge, it must find the comfort of other good arguments. In what sense? In this sense: following testimonial argumentation x is submitted to me, “Palestra di Botta e Risposta is located in Piazza Capitaniato”; can I say (i) I can believe in this testimonial argumentation and therefore know x only because I got testimonial argumentation that Palestra di Botta e Risposta is located in Piazza Capitaniato, or (ii) have I to find some good evidence to support this testimonial argumentation In epistemological environment, if you answer (i) you are “gullible”, “fundamentalist” and therefore anti-reductionist; if you answer (ii) you are “anti-gullible”, “suspicious” and therefore reductionist. This is the reason why JPII must be considered as a suspicious, reductionist arguer: he considers his testimonial argumentation as an imperfect source of knowledge, which is perfected gradually through only "personal accumulation of evidence. “It means that further argumentations, or other different evidences are required to bear and support the initial argumentation.” I would like to start this research with some questions that I think will clearly emerge from this reading: first, 1) is the testimonial argumentation an epistemic argumentation? 2) And then, if so, what epistemic argument are we talking about? 3) And, again, is it reductionist as the "excellent” testimony of John Paul II implies, or is it non-reductionist? In this work we will try to give some answers to these questions, starting with a philosophical analysis of the testimonial argumentation and then trying to draw some philosophical-proceedings consequences.