U.S. Role in the Formation of the New Government in Iraq (April 2003 – June 2006)

Relevance. In contemporary academic and sociopolitical discourse, debates concerning the approaches of the foreign policy of the U.S. remain highly relevant. Both at the international level and among American political elite, U.S. involvement in international conflicts is often regarded as a factor contributing to destabilization in the regions of the U.S. engagement. Another group of critics argues that the core problem is the tendency of the U.S. to avoid clear and binding security commitments beyond the framework of treaty-based alliances established during the Cold War. U.S. policy toward Iraq during the period of the establishment of the post-Baathist government of Iraq (April 2003 – June 2006) is particularly illustrative for analyzing the decisions made by G. W. Bush administration that contributed to the subsequent destabilization of Iraq, as well as the instruments employed to address the resulting crisis. The purpose of the article is to examine the role of the U.S. in shaping a new Iraqi government amid military and political destabilization of Iraq. The methodology of the study is based on the neopositivist approach, which seeks to present objective reality through the analysis of historical facts. The research methodology is based on the assessment of past events and phenomena within their specific historical context. The article employs the method of critical source analysis in order to identify potential biases and evaluate the credibility of a source. In addition, the article applies the following methods: historical-genetic, chronological and periodization. Results. Following the removal of Saddam Hussein’s government, the main objective of the United States was to ensure the establishment of a stable and democratic Iraqi government in order to prevent political forces capable of threatening regional stability from returning to power. The United States controlled the process of Iraq’s political transformation and gradually transferred power to a transitional government composed of former political exiles. The January 2005 elections in Iraq led to the formation of an elected interim government, followed by a permanent government in December 2005, in accordance with the provisions of the new Constitution. Despite the successful establishment of a representative government, significant problems within Iraqi society were evident, including ethno-confessional divisions and widespread support for insurgents among the Sunni population. The United States played a key role in addressing the challenges of Iraq’s political development and committed substantial resources to the reconstruction of Iraq and its armed forces. These measures proved insufficient to overcome the systemic crisis of Iraq. Ultimately, these factors led to the outbreak of a de facto civil war in Iraq following the terrorist attacks on the al-Askariyya Shiite mosque on February 22, 2006. The Sunni provinces of Anbar and Diyala, as well as the Kurdish autonomous region, were beyond the control of the Iraqi government. Conclusions. Following the overthrow of the government of Saddam Hussein, the U.S. underestimated the challenges it faced in Iraq, such as deep-rooted ethnic and sectarian divisions and the limited institutional capacity of the newly established Iraqi government. These factors contributed to substantial local support for Islamist terrorist groups. As the stability of Iraq constituted a key component of U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf region, the G. W. Bush administration employed extensive military, economic, and diplomatic instruments in an effort to overcome the crisis.