Explanatory Solutions to Skeptical Problems

Abstract In Appearance & Explanation, Kevin McCain and Luca Moretti developed “Phenomenal Explanationism” (PE). PE is a theory of epistemic justification that combines an explanationist theory of evidential support with an appearance-based/phenomenal conception of evidence. According to PE, epistemic justification is a matter of what best explains our evidence, which ultimately consists of appearances. In Appearance & Explanation it was argued that PE is a complete internalist theory of epistemic justification that delivers on the promises of other appearance-based theories while avoiding their pitfalls. One of the promises of PE is that it provides a satisfactory response to skepticism. However, in Appearance & Explanation only PE’s response to external world skepticism was discussed, and that discussion of the issue was limited. In Explanatory Solutions to Skeptical Problems the discussion of PE’s response to external world skepticism is greatly expanded. This isn’t all though. In Explanatory Solutions to Skeptical Problems readers will find that PE also offers solutions to a host of other perennial skeptical problems, including the problem of the criterion, the regress of justification, memory skepticism, and inductive skepticism. The promise PE displays in responding to these problems makes it plain that it is a viable theory of epistemic justification worthy of careful consideration and that accepting internalism more generally doesn’t leave one without reasonable responses to skeptical problems.