Problems of the Second Punic War

There has been general agreement both in ancient and in modern times that Hannibal's hope of final victory rested mainly on the chance of arousing widespread disaffection to the cause of Rome among the populations of Italy. It was natural that he should overrate this prospect. He knew that many of the nations which had been welded into a great confederacy under Roman leadership had fought stoutly for their independence and retained vivid memories of the not far distant contest. I propose to study the extent to which the cities and peoples of Italy gave aid to the invader, and to show how the relations of the revolting Italians with the predominant power were changed thereby. Ancient authors made extravagant statements about Hannibal's success in sowing strife between Rome and her allies. In this respect there is nothing to choose between Polybius and Livy. They themselves enable us in large measure to detect the great insecurity of their hasty generalisations. Yet modern writers often echo the errors and fail to supply, or only inadequately give, the corrections. Solely by a thorough and somewhat tedious scrutiny of details can the untrustworthiness of the large general assertions be fully exhibited. The process must resemble somewhat that of cross-examination in a court of law, whereby unsound evidence is gradually broken down. I have been induced to undertake the task by failure to find elsewhere any treatment of the subject which makes an approach to completeness.