Search engine for discovering works of Art, research articles, and books related to Art and Culture
Javascript must be enabled to continue!
NAGEL VS. NAGEL ON THE NATURE OF PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS
View through CrossRef
AbstractIn a footnote to his ‘What is it Like to be a Bat?’, Thomas Nagel sketches a promising account of phenomenal concepts that purports to explain why mind‐body identity statements, even if necessary, will always seem contingent. Christopher Hill and Brian McLaughlin have recently developed this sketch into a more robust theory. In Nagel's more recent work, however, he suggests that the only adequate theory of phenomenal concepts is one that makes the relation between phenomenal and physical states intelligible, or ‘transparent’. Developing such a theory, however, appears to be no easy task. In this paper I argue that the Nagel‐Hill‐McLaughlin proposal is preferable – and that a serious problem with it, noticed by Stephen Yablo, can be avoided by revising the proposal according to some further suggestions made by Nagel himself.
Title: NAGEL VS. NAGEL ON THE NATURE OF PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS
Description:
AbstractIn a footnote to his ‘What is it Like to be a Bat?’, Thomas Nagel sketches a promising account of phenomenal concepts that purports to explain why mind‐body identity statements, even if necessary, will always seem contingent.
Christopher Hill and Brian McLaughlin have recently developed this sketch into a more robust theory.
In Nagel's more recent work, however, he suggests that the only adequate theory of phenomenal concepts is one that makes the relation between phenomenal and physical states intelligible, or ‘transparent’.
Developing such a theory, however, appears to be no easy task.
In this paper I argue that the Nagel‐Hill‐McLaughlin proposal is preferable – and that a serious problem with it, noticed by Stephen Yablo, can be avoided by revising the proposal according to some further suggestions made by Nagel himself.
Related Results
Think Globally, Experience Locally?
Think Globally, Experience Locally?
This chapter explores how accounts of phenomenal unity can not only satisfy the phenomenality constraint, but also a version of globality. Global phenomenal unity could then be cal...
Experienced Wholeness
Experienced Wholeness
An interdisciplinary account of phenomenal unity, investigating how experiential wholes can be characterized and how such characterizations can be analyzed computationally.
...
Thomas Nagel
Thomas Nagel
Thomas Nagels contribution to philosophy over the past forty years has been enormously influential. In this book, the first sustained examination of Nagels ideas, Alan Thomas pro...
Current trends of perception, evaluation and meaning of “nature”: a study of general and special perception of nature using the example of the historic park landscape “Wörlitzer Aktuelle”.
Current trends of perception, evaluation and meaning of “nature”: a study of general and special perception of nature using the example of the historic park landscape “Wörlitzer Aktuelle”.
The examination of sensation and meaning of the term "nature" bases essentially on the assumption of a "subject-nature". This idea describes a nature which can give something to th...
Why the Single State Conception Does Not Solve the Problem of Phenomenal Unity
Why the Single State Conception Does Not Solve the Problem of Phenomenal Unity
This chapter discusses a common conception of phenomenal unity, the single state conception (SSC). The intuition underlying SSC is that phenomenal unity goes along with the existen...
The consciousness of visual experience
The consciousness of visual experience
[ACCESS RESTRICTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI AT AUTHOR'S REQUEST.] "This monograph mainly concerns two distinctive features of visual experience. First, visual experience has i...
Representational Holism
Representational Holism
This chapter discusses ways in which the problem of phenomenal unity can be analyzed on the representationalist level of description. Having characterized phenomenal unity as a kin...
Framing the Problem of Phenomenal Unity (PPU)
Framing the Problem of Phenomenal Unity (PPU)
This chapter lays the conceptual foundation for the rest of the book. The problem of phenomenal unity (PPU) is defined and a general path to its solution is proposed. Apart from th...