Wittgenstein Foundationalism

Abstract We can say, then, that for Wittgenstein the applicability of doubt is one of the features that defines the language game. This is a complex thought with many ramifications. One is that where doubt is inapplicable we are dealing with matters that do not belong to the language game. A subcase of this is the subject matter of this chapter, namely, a highly original form of foundationalism that Wittgenstein develops in On Certainty. The foundations of the language game stand outside of and yet support the language game-exactly how is what we shall be discussing below. These foundations are identified in a series of metaphors as “the hinges on which others turn,” “the rock bottom of our convictions,” “the substratum of all my inquiring,” and most pervasively “that which stands fast for us and for many others” (O.C., 116). All of these expressions are metaphors for certainty. It is Wittgenstein’s main thesis in On Certainty that what stands fast is not subject to justification, proof, the adducing of evidence, or doubt and is neither true nor false. Whatever is subject to these ascriptions belongs to the language game. But certitude is not so subject, and therefore it stands outside of the language game. It does so in two different forms, one relative, the other absolute. A proposition that is exempt from doubt in some contexts may become subject to doubt in others, and when it does it plays a role within the language game. This is the relativized form of certitude. But some propositions-that the earth exists, that the earth is very old-are beyond any doubt; their certitude is absolute.