Divine Love, Divine Holiness, and the Atonement

Abstract The chapter contrasts what we should expect and require from a theory of Atonement if we take divine action to be governed by the holiness framework and if we do not. The primary foil is Eleonore Stump’s unqualifiedly and exclusively love framework account of the Atonement. Stump’s way of categorizing theories of the Atonement based on whether the obstacle to union with God is in us or in God is inadequate; rather, the appropriate distinction is between views that take the obstacle to be psychological (as Stump’s own view does) or normative (as satisfaction and penal substitution views do). By Stump’s own lights, the way in which past sin is an obstacle to union with God requires a normative treatment, and the holiness framework provides a plausible explanation of this: so long as such past sin is not dealt with, it normatively precludes the fuller unity with God that is constitutive of our good.