Causalism

Abstract The book advances big-picture causalism: a naturalistic conception of agency and free agency that unifies the two phenomena under a common thesis. This is the thesis that actions/free actions are behaviors that have the right kinds of causes or explanations. The book discusses how a causalist view of action and free action fit together—the latter as a natural extension of the former—and how they are motivated by similar considerations having to do with causal control. The result is a compelling “package deal” view of our practical agency, one that is put forth as the default view (the view that deserves to be regarded as the starting point of our theorizing). The book discusses both the skeleton of the causalist view as well as potential enrichments that result from exploiting the grounds of the relevant causal facts. The discussion itself is enriched by an account of the role played in causalism by key metaphysical notions such as causation, grounding, absences, and powers.