Categorial versus naturalized epistemology

AbstractHow do we know what kinds of things constitute knowledge or justified belief? Naturalized epistemology is committed to denying a priori insight into the kinds of kinds that are and are not knowledge or justification makers. By contrast, it is argued here that knowledge of these matters is a priori knowledge of a special kind. Such knowledge may be called “categorial.” The dialectical give and take between categorial and naturalized epistemology is pursued, before endorsing an argument that breaks the standoff in favor of categorial epistemology. In particular, an argument is given for a certain kind of mathematical skepticism that is entirely a priori. The skeptical argument turns on categorial claims about actuality. Responses are considered before defending a method of categorial dumbfounding in certain circumstances. This yields a positive argument for the categoriality of fundamental epistemic principles. The categorial rationalist conclusions are embraced and some consequences noted.