Why Blame the Ostrich? Understanding Culpability for Willful Ignorance

Willful Ignorance (WI) is a term in Anglo-American law to refer to circumstances in which a defendant remains intentionally unaware of a fact that would render them liable. These cases pose a unique problem for the law, as it is uncertain whether deliberate ignorance can be viewed as a form of knowledge and, therefore, whether they satisfy the mens rea requirement for culpability. In this chapter, we report two experimental studies modeled on Unites States vs. Jewell, a case in which Jewell aided an international drug trafficking operation by transporting a suitcase which he deliberately avoided inspecting. We manipulated various features of the defendant's epistemic state, relating to their suspicion, its reasonableness and its specificity. Our results showed that WI partially satisfies the mens rea requirement, though not to the extent of genuine knowledge. Participants considered willful ignorance incriminating, as long as the defendant suspected that they were involved in criminal activity, and regardless of whether their suspicion was reasonable or even true. Additionally, our studies suggested that judgments of culpability are related to broader inferences about the defendant's antisocial tendencies — in line with theories that conceptualise WI as a demonstration of 'ill will'. In closing, we elaborate on the implications of our findings for the broader legal-theoretical debate around the normative propriety of the willful ignorance doctrine.